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Stackelberg Contention Games in Multiuser Networks
Jaeok Park∗and Mihaela van der Schaar†
Abstract
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a
non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their trans-
mission probabilities independently without any coordination mechanism, Nash equilibria usually
result in a network collapse. We propose a methodology that transforms the non-cooperative
game into a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria of the Stackelberg game can overcome the
deficiency of the Nash equilibria of the original game. A particular type of Stackelberg interven-
tion is constructed to show that any positive payoff profile feasible with independent transmission
probabilities can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium payoff profile. We discuss criteria to
select an operating point of the network and informational requirements for the Stackelberg game.
We relax the requirements and examine the effects of relaxation on performance.
1 Introduction
In wireless communication networks, multiple users often share a common channel and contend for
access. To resolve the contention problem, many different medium access control (MAC) protocols
have been devised and used. Recently, the selfish behavior of users in MAC protocols has been
studied using game theory. There have been attempts to understand the existing MAC protocols
as the local utility maximizing behavior of selfish users by reverse-engineering the current protocols
(e.g., [1]). It has also been investigated whether existing protocols are vulnerable to the existence of
selfish users who pursue their self-interest in a non-cooperative manner. Non-cooperative behavior
often leads to inefficient outcomes. For example, in the 802.11 distributed MAC protocol, DCF,
and its enhanced version, EDCF, competition among selfish users can lead to an inefficient use of
the shared channel in Nash equilibria [2]. Similarly, a prisoner’s dilemma phenomenon arises in a
non-cooperative game for a generalized version of slotted-Aloha protocols [3].
In general, if a game has Nash equilibria yielding low payoffs for the players, it will be desirable
for them to transform the game to extend the set of equilibria to include better outcomes [4]. The
∗Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477, USA
(e-mail: jpark31@ucla.edu)
†Department of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594,
USA (e-mail: mihaela@ee.ucla.edu)
1
same idea can be applied to the game played by selfish users who compete for access to a common
medium. If competition among selfish users brings about a network collapse, then it is beneficial
for them to design a device which provides incentives to behave cooperatively. Game theory [4]
discusses three types of transformation: 1) games with contracts, 2) games with communication,
and 3) repeated games.
A game is said to be with contracts if the players of the game can communicate and bargain
with each other, and enforce the agreement with a binding contract. The main obstacle to apply
this approach to wireless networking is the distributed nature of wireless networks. To reach an
agreement, users should know the network system and be able to communicate with each other.
They should also be able to enforce the agreed plan.
A game with communication is the one in which players can communicate with each other
through a mediator but they cannot write a binding contract. In this case, a correlated equilibrium
is predicted to be played. [5] studies correlated equilibria using a coordination mechanism in a
slotted Aloha-type scenario. Unlike the first approach, this does not require that the actions of
players be enforceable. However, to apply this approach to the medium access problem, signals
need to be conveyed from a mediator to all users, and users need to know the correct meanings of
the signals.
A repeated game is a dynamic game in which the same game is played repeatedly by the same
players over finite or infinite periods. Repeated interactions among the same players enable them
to sustain cooperation by punishing deviations in subsequent periods. A main challenge of applying
the idea of repeated games to wireless networks is that the users should keep track of their past
observations and be able to detect deviations and to coordinate their actions in order to punish
deviating users.
Besides the three approaches above, another approach widely applied to communication net-
works is pricing [6]. A central entity charges prices to users in order to control their utilization of
the network. Nash equilibria with pricing schemes in an Aloha network are analyzed in [7, 8]. Im-
plementing a pricing scheme requires the central entity to have relevant system information as well
as users’ benefits and costs, which are often their private information. Eliciting private information
often results in an efficiency loss in the presence of the strategic behavior of users as shown in [9].
Even in the case where the entity has all the relevant information, prices need to be computed and
communicated to the users.
In this paper, we propose yet another approach using a Stackelberg game. We introduce a
network manager as an additional user and make him access the medium according to a certain
rule. Unlike the Stackelberg game of [10] in which the manager (the leader) chooses a certain
strategy before users (followers) make their decisions, in the proposed Stackelberg game he sets
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an intervention rule first and then implements his intervention after users choose their strategies.
Alternatively, the proposed Stackelberg game can be considered as a generalized Stackelberg game
in which there are multiple leaders (users) and a single follower (the manager) and the leaders know
the response of the follower to their decisions correctly. With appropriate choices of intervention
rules, the manager can shape the incentives of users in such a way that their selfish behavior results
in cooperative outcomes.
In the context of cognitive radio networks, [11] proposes a related Stackelberg game in which the
owner of a licensed frequency band (the leader) can charge a virtual price for using the frequency
band to cognitive radios (followers). The virtual price signals the extent to which cognitive radios
can exploit the licensed frequency band. However, since prices are virtual, selfish users may ignore
prices when they make decisions if they can gain by doing so. On the contrary, in the Stackelberg
game of this paper, the intervention of the manager is not virtual but it results in the reduction of
throughput, which selfish users care about for sure. Hence, the intervention method provides better
grounds for the network manager to deal with the selfish behavior of users.
[12] and [13] use game theoretic models to study random access. Their approach is to capture
the information and implementation constraints using the game theoretic framework and to specify
utility functions so that a desired operating point is achieved at a Nash equilibrium. If conditions
under which a certain type of dynamic adjustment play converges to the Nash equilibrium are met,
such a strategy update mechanism can be used to derive a distributed algorithm that converges to
the desired operating point. However, this control-theoretic approach to game theory assumes that
users are obedient. In this paper, our main concern is about the selfish behavior of users who have
innate objectives. Because we start from natural utility functions and affect them by devising an
intervention scheme, we are in a better position to deal with selfish users. Furthermore, the idea of
intervention can potentially lead to a distributed algorithm to achieve a desired operating point.
By formulating the medium access problem as a non-cooperative game, we show the following
main results:
1. Because the Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game are inefficient and/or unfair, we
transform the original game into a Stackelberg game, in which any feasible outcome with
independent transmission probabilities can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium.
2. A particular form of a Stackelberg intervention strategy, called total relative deviation (TRD)-
based intervention, is constructed and used to achieve any feasible outcome with independent
transmission probabilities.
3. The additional amount of information flows required for the transformation is relatively mod-
erate, and it can be further reduced without large efficiency losses.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and formulates it
as a non-cooperative game called the contention game. Nash equilibria of the contention game are
characterized, and it is shown that they typically yield suboptimal performance. In Section 3, we
transform the contention game into another related game called the Stackelberg contention game by
introducing an intervening manager. We show that the manager can implement any transmission
probability profile as a Stackelberg equilibrium using a class of intervention functions. Section 4
discusses natural candidates for the target transmission probability profile selected by the manager.
In Section 5, we discuss the flows of information required for our results and examine the implications
of some relaxations of the requirements on performance. Section 6 provides numerical results, and
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Contention Game Model
We consider a simple contention model in which multiple users share a communication channel
as in [14]. A user represents a transmitter-receiver pair. Time is divided into slots of the same
duration. Every user has a packet to transmit and can send the packet or wait. If there is only
one transmission, the packet is successfully transmitted within the time slot. If more than one user
transmits a packet simultaneously in a slot, a collision occurs and no packet is transmitted.
We summarize the assumptions of our contention model.
1. A fixed set of users interacts over a given period of time (or a session).
2. Time is divided into multiple slots, and slots are synchronized.
3. A user always has a packet to transmit in every slot.
4. The transmission of a packet is completed within a slot.
5. A user transmits its packet with the same probability in every slot. There is no adjustment
in the transmission probabilities during the session. This excludes coordination among users,
for example, using time division multiplexing.
6. There is no cost of transmitting a packet.
We formulate the medium access problem as a non-cooperative game to analyze the behavior of
selfish users. We denote the set of users by N = {1, . . . , n}. Because we assume that a user uses
the same transmission probability over the entire session, the strategy of a user is its transmission
probability, and we denote the strategy of user i by pi and the strategy space of user i by Pi = [0, 1]
for all i ∈ N .
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Once the users decide their transmission probabilities, a strategy profile can be constructed. The
users transmit their packets independently according to their transmission probabilities, and thus
the strategy profile determines the probability of a successful transmission by user i in a slot. A
strategy profile can be written as a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) in P = P1× · · · ×Pn, the set of strategy
profiles. The payoff function of user i, ui : P → R, is defined as
ui(p) = kipi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj), (1)
where ki > 0 measures the value of transmission of user i and pi
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj) is the probability of
successful transmission by user i.
We define the contention game by the tuple Γ = 〈N, (Pi), (ui)〉. If the users choose their trans-
mission probabilities taking others’ transmission probabilities as given, then the resulting outcome
can be described by the solution concept of Nash equilibrium [4]. We first characterize the Nash
equilibria of the contention game.
Proposition 1 A strategy profile p ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of the contention game Γ if and only
if pi = 1 for at least one i.
Proof : In the contention game, the best response correspondence of user i assumes two sets:
bi(p−i) = {1} if
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj) > 0 and bi(p−i) = [0, 1] if
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj) = 0. Suppose that user i
chooses pi = 1. Then it is playing its best response while other users are also playing their best
responses, which establishes the sufficiency part. To prove the necessity part, suppose that p is a
Nash equilibrium and pi < 1 for all i ∈ N . Since
∏
j 6=i(1− pj) > 0, pi is not a best response to p−i,
which is a contradiction.
If a Nash equilibrium p has only one user i such that pi = 1, then ui(p) > 0 and uj(p) = 0 for
all j 6= i where ui(p) can be as large as ki. If there are at least two users with the transmission
probability equal to 1, then we have ui(p) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Let Ui = {u ∈ R
n : ui ∈ [0, ki], uj =
0 ∀j 6= i}. Then, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs is given by
U(NE) =
n⋃
i=1
Ui. (2)
Given the game Γ, we can define the set of feasible payoffs by
U = {(u1(p), . . . , un(p)) : p ∈ P}. (3)
A payoff profile u in U is Pareto efficient if there is no other element v in U such that v ≥ u and vi >
ui for at least one user i. We also call a strategy profile p Pareto efficient if u(p) = (u1(p), . . . , un(p))
is a Pareto efficient payoff profile. Let U(PE) be the set of Pareto efficient payoffs.
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Figure 1: Payoff profiles with two homogeneous users with k1 = k2 = 1. (a) The set of feasible
payoffs when coordination between two users is possible. (b) The set of Nash equilibrium payoffs.
(c) The set of feasible payoffs with independent transmission probabilities.
There are n points in U(NE)∩U(PE), namely, u such that ui = ki and uj = 0 for all j 6= i, for
i = 1, . . . , n. These are the corner points of U(PE) in which only one user receives a positive payoff.
Therefore, Nash equilibrium payoff profiles are either inefficient or unfair. Moreover, since pi = 1 is
a weakly dominant strategy for every user i, in a sense that ui(1,p−i) ≥ ui(p) for all p ∈ P , the most
likely Nash equilibrium is the one in which pi = 1 for all i ∈ N . At the most likely Nash equilibrium,
every user always transmits its packet, and as a result no packet is successfully transmitted. Hence,
the selfish behavior of the users is likely to lead to a network collapse, which gives zero payoff to
every user, as argued also in [15].
Figure 1 presents the payoff spaces of two homogeneous users with k1 = k2 = 1. If coordination
between the two users is possible, they can achieve any payoff profile in the dark area of Figure
1(a). For example, (1/2, 1/2) can be achieved by arranging user 1 to transmit only in odd-numbered
slots and user 2 only in even-numbered slots. This kind of coordination can be supported through
direct communications among the users or mediated communications. However, if such coordination
is not possible and each user has to choose one transmission probability, Nash equilibria yield the
payoff profiles in Figure 1(b). The set of feasible payoffs of the contention game is shown as the
dark area of Figure 1(c). The set of Pareto-efficient payoff profiles is the frontier of that area. The
lack of coordination makes the set of feasible payoffs smaller reducing the area of Figure 1(a) to
that of Figure 1(c). Because the typical Nash equilibrium payoff is (0, 0), the next section develops
a transformation of the contention game, and the set of equilibria of the resulting Stackelberg game
is shown to expand to the entire area of Figure 1(c).
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3 Stackelberg Contention Game
We introduce a network manager as a special kind of user in the contention game and call him user
0. As a user, the manager can access the channel with a certain transmission probability. However,
the manager is different from the users in that he can choose his transmission probability depending
on the transmission probabilities of the users. This ability of the manager enables him to act as the
police. If the users access the channel excessively, the manager can intervene and punish them by
choosing a high transmission probability, thus reducing the success rates of the users.
Formally, the strategy of the manager is an intervention function g : P → [0, 1], which gives
his transmission probability p0 = g(p) when the strategy profile of the users is p. g(p) can be
interpreted as the level of intervention or punishment by the manager when the users choose p.
Note that the level of intervention by the manager is the same for every user. We assume that the
manager has a specific “target” strategy profile p˜, that his transmission has no value to him (as well
as to others), and that he is benevolent. One representation of his objective is the payoff function
of the following form:
u0(g,p) =

 1− g(p) if p = p˜,0 otherwise. (4)
This payoff function means that the manager wants the users to operate at the target strategy profile
p˜ with the minimum level of intervention.
We call the transformed game the Stackelberg contention game because the manager chooses his
strategy g before the users make their decisions on the transmission probabilities. In this sense, the
manager can be thought of as a Stackelberg leader and the users as followers. The specific timing
of the Stackelberg contention game can be outlined as follows:
1. The network manager determines his intervention function.
2. Knowing the intervention function of the manager, the users choose their transmission prob-
abilities simultaneously.
3. Observing the strategy profile of the users, the manager determines the level of intervention
using his intervention function.
4. The transmission probabilities of the manager and the users determine their payoffs.
Timing 1 happens before the session starts. Timing 2 occurs at the beginning of the session
whereas timing 3 occurs when the manager knows the transmission probabilities of all the users.
Therefore, there is a time lag between the time when the session begins and when the manager
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Figure 2: Schematic illustration of (a) the contention game and (b) the Stackelberg contention game.
(i),(ii), and (iii) represent the order of moves in the Stackelberg contention game, and the dotted
arrows represent the flows of information required for the Stackelberg contention game.
starts to intervene. Payoffs can be calculated as the probability of successful transmission averaged
over the entire session, multiplied by valuation. If the interval between timing 2 and timing 3 is
short relative to the duration of the session, the payoff of user i can be approximated as the payoff
during the intervention using the following payoff function:
ui(g,p) = kipi(1− g(p))
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj). (5)
The transformation of the contention game into the Stackelberg contention game is schematically
shown in Figure 2. The figure shows that the main role of the manager is to set the intervention
rule and to implement it. The users still behave non-cooperatively maximizing their payoffs, and
the intervention of the manager affects their selfish behavior even though the manager does neither
directly control their behavior nor continuously communicate with the users to convey coordination
or price signals.
In the Stackelberg routing game of [10], the strategy spaces of the manager and a user coincide. If
that is the case in the Stackelberg contention game, i.e., if the manager chooses a single transmission
probability before the users choose theirs, then this intervention only makes the channel lossy but it
does not provide incentives for users not to choose the maximum possible transmission probability.
Hence, in order to provide an incentive to choose a smaller transmission probability, the manager
needs to vary his transmission probability depending on the transmission probabilities of the users.
A Stackelberg game is analyzed using a backward induction argument. The leader predicts the
Nash equilibrium behavior of the followers given his strategy and chooses the best strategy for him.
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The same argument can be applied to the Stackelberg contention game. Once the manager decides
his strategy g and commits to implement his transmission probability according to g, the rest of the
Stackelberg contention game (timing 2–4) can be viewed as a non-cooperative game played by the
users. Given the intervention function g, the payoff function of user i can be written as
u˜i(p; g) = kipi(1− g(p))
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj). (6)
In essence, the role of the manager is to change the non-cooperative game that the users play from
the contention game Γ to a new game Γg = 〈N, (Pi), (u˜i(·; g))〉, which we call the contention game
with intervention g. Understanding the non-cooperative behavior of the users given the intervention
function g, the manager will choose g that maximizes his payoff.
We now define an equilibrium concept for the Stackelberg contention game.
Definition 1 An intervention function of the manager g and a profile of the transmission probabili-
ties of the users pˆ = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium if (i) pˆ is a Nash equilibrium
of the contention game with intervention g and (ii) pˆ = p˜ and g(pˆ) = 0.
Combining (i) and (ii), an equivalent definition is that (g, p˜) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if p˜ is a
Nash equilibrium of Γg and g(p˜) = 0. Condition (i) says that once the manager chooses his strategy,
the users will play a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the resulting game, and condition (ii) says
that expecting the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the users, the manager chooses his strategy
that achieves his objective.
3.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium with TRD-based Intervention
As we have mentioned earlier, the manager can choose only one level of intervention that affects
the users equally. A question that arises is which strategy profile the manager can implement as
a Stackelberg equilibrium with one level of intervention for every user. We answer this question
constructively. We propose a specific form of an intervention function with which the manager
can attain any strategy profile p˜ with 0 < p˜i < 1 for all i. The basic idea of this result is that
because the strategy of the manager is not a single intervention level but a function whose value
depends on the strategies of the users, he can discriminate the users by reacting differently to their
transmission probabilities in choosing the level of intervention. Therefore, even though the realized
level of intervention is the same for every user, the manager can induce the users to choose different
transmission probabilities.
To construct such an intervention function, we first define the total relative deviation (TRD) of
p from p˜ by
h(p) =
n∑
i=1
pi − p˜i
p˜i
=
p1
p˜1
+ · · ·+
pn
p˜n
− n. (7)
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Since g determines the transmission probability of the manager, its range should lie in [0, 1]. To
satisfy this constraint, we define the TRD-based intervention function by
g∗(p) = [h(p)]10 (8)
where the operator [x]ba = min{max{x, a}, b} is used to obtain the “trimmed” value of TRD between
0 and 1.
The TRD-based intervention can be interpreted in the following way. The manager sets the
target at p˜. As long as the users choose small transmission probabilities so that the TRD of p from
p˜ does not exceed zero, the manager does not intervene. If it is larger than zero, the manager will
respond to a one-unit increase in pi by increasing p0 by
1
p˜i
units until the TRD reaches 1. The
manager determines the degree of punishment based on the target transmission probability profile.
If he wants a user to transmit with a low probability, then his punishment against its deviation is
strong.
Proposition 2 (g∗, p˜) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof : We need to check two things. First, p˜ is a Nash Equilibrium of Γg∗ . Second, g
∗(p˜) = 0.
It is straightforward to confirm the second. To show the first, the payoff function of user i given
others’ strategies p˜−i is
u˜i(pi, p˜−i; g
∗) = kipi (1− g
∗(pi, p˜−i))
∏
j 6=i
(1− p˜j) (9)
=


0 if pi > 2p˜i,
kipi
(
2− pip˜i
)∏
j 6=i(1− p˜j) if p˜i ≤ pi ≤ 2p˜i,
kipi
∏
j 6=i(1− p˜j) if pi < p˜i.
(10)
It can be seen from the above expression that u˜i(pi, p˜−i; g
∗) is increasing on pi < p˜i, reaches a peak
at pi = p˜i, is decreasing on p˜i < pi < 2p˜i, and then stays at 0 on pi ≥ 2p˜i. Therefore, user i’s best
response to p˜−i is p˜i for all i, and thus p˜ constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the contention game
with TRD-based intervention, Γg∗ .
Corollary 1 Any feasible payoff profile u ∈ U of the contention game with ui > 0 for all i ∈ N can
be achieved by a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Corollary 1 resembles the Folk theorem of repeated games [4] in that it claims that any feasible
outcome can be attained as an equilibrium. Incentives not to deviate from a certain operating point
are provided by the manager’s intervention in the Stackelberg contention game, while in a repeated
game players do not deviate since a deviation is followed by punishment from other players.
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3.2 Nash Equilibria of the Contention Game with TRD-based Intervention
In Proposition 2, we have seen that p˜ is a Nash equilibrium of the contention game with TRD-based
intervention. However, if other Nash equilibria exist, the outcome may be different from the one
that the manager intends. In fact, any strategy profile p with pi = 1 for at least one i is still a Nash
equilibrium of Γg∗ . The following proposition characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of Γg∗ that are
different from those of Γ.
Proposition 3 Consider a strategy profile pˆ with pˆi < 1 for all i ∈ N . pˆ is a Nash equilibrium of
the contention game with TRD-based intervention if and only if either
(i) pˆ = p˜ (11)
or
(ii)
∑
j 6=i
pˆj − p˜j
p˜j
≥ 2 for all i = 1, . . . , n. (12)
Proof : See Appendix A.
Transforming Γ to Γg∗ does not eliminate the Nash equilibria of the contention game. Rather,
the set of Nash equilibria expands to include two classes of new equilibria. The first Nash equilibrium
of Proposition 3 is the one that the manager intends the users to play. The second class of Nash
equilibria are those in which the sum of relative deviations of other users is already too large that
no matter how small transmission probability user i chooses, the level of intervention stays the same
at 1.
Since p˜ is chosen to satisfy 0 < p˜i < 1 for all i and g
∗ satisfies g∗(p˜) = 0, it follows that
u˜i(p˜) > 0 for all i.
1 For the second class of Nash equilibria in Proposition 3, u˜i(pˆ) = 0 for all i
because g∗(pˆ) = 1. Therefore, the payoff profile of the second class of Nash equilibria is Pareto
dominated by that of the intended Nash equilibrium in that the intended Nash equilibrium yields a
higher payoff for every user compared to the second class of Nash equilibria.
The same conclusion holds for Nash equilibria with more than one user with transmission prob-
ability 1 because every user gets zero payoff. Finally, the remaining Nash equilibria are those with
exactly one user with transmission probability 1. Suppose that pi = 1. Then the highest payoff for
user i is achieved when pj = 0 for all j 6= i. Denoting this strategy profile by ei, the payoff profile
of ei is Pareto dominated by that of p˜ if 1− g
∗(ei) = 1 + n−
1
p˜i
< p˜i
∏
j 6=i(1− p˜j).
1Since we mostly consider the TRD-based intervention function g∗, we will use u˜i(p˜) instead of u˜i(p˜; g
∗) when
there is no confusion.
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3.3 Reaching the Stackelberg Equilibrium
We have seen that there are multiple Nash equilibria of the contention game with TRD-based
intervention and that the Nash equilibrium p˜ in general yields higher payoffs to the users than other
Nash equilibria. If the users are aware of the welfare properties of different Nash equilibria, they
will tend to select p˜.
Suppose that the users play the second class of Nash equilibria in Proposition 3 for some reason.
If the Stackelberg contention game is played repeatedly and the users anticipate that the strategy
profile of the other users will be the same as that of the last period, then it can be shown that
under certain conditions there is a sequence of intervention functions convergent to g∗ that the
manager can employ to have the users reach the intended Nash equilibrium p˜, thus approaching the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose that at t = 0 the manager chooses the intervention function g∗ and that
the users play a Nash equilibrium pˆ0 of the second class.
Without loss of generality, the users are enumerated so that the following holds:
pˆ01
p˜1
≤
pˆ02
p˜2
≤ . . . ≤
pˆ0n−1
p˜n−1
≤
pˆ0n
p˜n
. (13)
Suppose further that for each i, either pˆ
0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
< 2 or
pˆ0i
p˜i
≤ 1 holds.
At t ≥ 1; Define
ct =
∑
j 6=n
pˆt−1j
p˜j
+ 1. (14)
Assume that the manager employs the intervention function gt(p) = [ht(p)]10 where
ht(p) =
p1
p˜1
+ · · ·+
pn
p˜n
− ct (15)
and that user i chooses pˆti as a best response to pˆ
t−1
−i given g
t.
Then limt→∞ pˆ
t
i = p˜i for all i = 1, . . . , n and limt→∞ c
t = n.
Proof : See Appendix B.
The reason that no user has an incentive to deviate from the second class of Nash equilibria is
that since others use high transmission probabilities, the TRD is over 1 no matter what transmission
probability a user chooses. Since the punishment level is always 1, a reduction of the transmission
probability by a user is not rewarded by a decreased level of intervention. If the relative deviations
of pi from p˜i are not too disperse, the manager can successively adjust down the effective range of
punishment so that he can react to the changes in the strategies of the users. Proposition 4 shows
that this procedure succeeds to have the strategy profile of the users converge to the intended Nash
equilibrium.
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4 Target Selection Criteria of the Manager
So far we have assumed that the manager has a target strategy profile p˜ and examined whether
he can find an intervention function that implements it as a Stackelberg equilibrium. This section
discusses selection criteria that the manager can use to choose the target strategy profile. To address
this issue, we rely on cooperative game theory because a reasonable choice of the manager should
have a close relationship to the likely outcome of bargaining among the users if bargaining were
possible for them [4]. The absence of communication opportunities among the users prevents them
from engaging in bargaining or from directly coordinating with each other.
4.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
The pair (F,v) is an n-person bargaining problem where F is a closed and convex subset of Rn,
representing the set of feasible payoff allocations and v = (v1, . . . , vn) is the disagreement payoff
allocation. Suppose that there exists y ∈ F such that yi > vi for every i.
Definition 2 x is the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person bargaining problem (F,v) if it is
the unique Pareto efficient vector that solves
max
x∈F,x≥v
n∏
i=1
(xi − vi). (16)
Consider the contention game Γ. (U ,0) can be regarded as an n-person bargaining problem
where U is defined in (3) and 0 is the disagreement point. The vector 0 is the natural disagreement
point because it is a Nash equilibrium payoff as well as the minimax value for each user. The only
departure from the standard theory is that the set of feasible payoffs U is not convex.2 However, we
can carry the definition of the Nash bargaining solution to our setting as in [15].
Since the manager knows the structure of the contention game, he can calculate the Nash bar-
gaining solution u for (U ,0) and find the strategy profile p˜ that yields u. Then the manager can
implement p˜ by choosing g∗ based on p˜. Notice that the presence of the manager does not decrease
the payoffs of the users because g∗(p˜) = 0. The Nash bargaining solution for (U ,0) has the following
simple form.
Proposition 5
(n−1)n−1
nn (k1, . . . , kn) is the Nash bargaining solution for (U ,0), and it is attained by
pi =
1
n for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof : The maximand in the definition of the Nash bargaining solution can be written as
max
u∈U ,u≥0
n∏
i=1
ui. (17)
2We do not allow public randomization among users, which requires coordination among them.
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Since any u ∈ U satisfies u ≥ 0, the above problem can be expressed in terms of p:
max
p∈P
(
n∏
i=1
ki
)
n∏
i=1
pi(1− pi)
n−1. (18)
The logarithm of the objective function is strictly concave in p, and the first-order optimality
condition gives pi =
1
n for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The Nash bargaining solution for (U ,0) treats every user equally in that it specifies the same
transmission probability for every user. Therefore, the manager does not need to know the vector
of the values of transmission k = (k1, . . . , kn) to implement the Nash bargaining solution. The Nash
bargaining solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [16] because the maximum payoff
for user i is ki and the Nash bargaining solution is the unique efficient payoff profile in which each
user receives a payoff proportional to its maximum feasible payoff.
If the manager wants to treat the users with discrimination, he can use the generalized Nash
product
n∏
i=1
(xi − vi)
ωi (19)
as the maximand to find a nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solution, where ωi > 0 represents the
weight for user i. One example of the weights is the valuation of the users.3 The nonsymmetric
Nash bargaining solution for (U ,0) can be shown to be achieved by pi =
ωiP
i ωi
for all i using the
similar method to the proof of Proposition 5.
4.2 Coalition-Proof Strategy Profile
If some of the users can communicate and collude effectively, the network manager may want to
choose a strategy profile which is self-enforcing even in the existence of coalitions. Since we define
a user as a transmitter-receiver pair, a collusion may occur when a single transmitter sends packets
to several destinations and controls the transmission probabilities of several users.
Given the set of users N = {1, . . . , n}, a coalition is any nonempty subset S of N . Let pS be
the strategy profile of the users in S.
Definition 3 p˜ is coalition-proof with respect to a coalition S in a non-cooperative game 〈N, [0, 1]N , (ui)〉
if there does not exist pS ∈ [0, 1]
S such that ui(pS , p˜−S) ≥ ui(p˜) for all i ∈ S and ui(pS , p˜−S) >
ui(p˜) for at least one user i ∈ S.
3If ki is private information, it would be interesting to construct a mechanism that induces users to reveal their
true values ki.
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By definition, p˜ is coalition-proof with respect to the grand coalition S = N if and only if
u(p˜) = (u1(p˜), . . . , un(p˜)) is Pareto efficient. If p˜ is a Nash equilibrium, then it is coalition-
proof with respect to any one-person “coalition.” The non-cooperative game of our interest is the
contention game with TRD-based intervention g∗.
Proposition 6 p˜ is coalition-proof with respect to a two-person coalition S = {i, j} in the con-
tention game with TRD-based intervention g∗ if and only if p˜i + p˜j ≤ 1.
Proof : See Appendix C.
The proof of Proposition 6 shows that if p˜i + p˜j > 1 then users i and j can jointly reduce their
transmission probabilities to increase their payoffs at the same time. For example, suppose that
users 1 and 2 are controlled by the same transmitter and that the manager selects the target p˜ with
p˜1 = 0.3 and p˜2 = 0.8. Then u˜1(p˜) = 0.06 k1
∏
j 6=1,2(1 − p˜j) and u˜2(p˜) = 0.56 k2
∏
j 6=1,2(1 − p˜j).
Suppose that the two users jointly deviate to (p1, p2) = (0.25, 0.75). Then the new payoffs are
u˜1(p1, p2, p˜N\{1,2}) = 0.0625 k1
∏
j 6=1,2(1 − p˜j) and u˜2(p1, p2, p˜N\{1,2}) = 0.5625 k2
∏
j 6=1,2(1 − p˜j),
which is strictly better for both users. A decrease in pi and pj at the same time also increases the
payoffs of all the users not belonging to the coalition, which implies that a target p˜ with p˜i+ p˜j > 1
is not Pareto efficient. This observation leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If p˜ is Pareto efficient in the contention game with TRD-based intervention g∗, then
it is coalition-proof with respect to any two-person coalition.
In fact, we can generalize the above corollary and provide a stronger statement.
Proposition 7 p˜ is Pareto efficient in the contention game with TRD-based intervention g∗ if and
only if it is coalition-proof with respect to any coalition.
Proof : See Appendix D.
5 Informational Requirement and Its Relaxation
We have introduced and analyzed the contention game and the Stackelberg contention game with
TRD-based intervention. In this section we discuss what the players of each game need to know in
order to play the corresponding equilibrium.
5.1 Contention Game and Nash Equilibrium
In a general non-cooperative game, each user needs to know, or predict correctly, the strategy profile
of others in order to find its best response strategy. In the contention game with the payoff function
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ui(p) = kipi
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj), it suffices for user i to know the sign of
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj), i.e., whether it
is positive or zero, to calculate its best response. On the other hand, pi = 1 is a weakly dominant
strategy for any user i, which means setting pi = 1 is weakly better no matter what strategies other
users choose. Hence, the Nash equilibrium p = (1, . . . , 1) does not require any knowledge on others’
strategies.
5.2 Stackelberg Contention Game with TRD-based Intervention and Stackel-
berg Equilibrium
Considering the timing of the Stackelberg contention game outlined in Section 3, we can list the
following requirements on the manager and the users for the Stackelberg equilibrium to be played.
Requirement M. Once the users choose the transmission probabilities, the manager observes the
strategy profile of the users.
The manager needs to decide the level of intervention as a function of the transmission probabil-
ities of the users. If the manager can distinguish the access of each user and have sufficiently many
observations to determine the transmission probability of each user, then this requirement will be
satisfied. If the manager can observe the channel state (idle, success, collision) and identify the users
of successfully transmitted packets, he can estimate the transmission probability of each user in the
following way. First, he can obtain an estimate of
∏
i∈N (1− pi) by calculating the frequency of idle
slots, called qidle. Second, he can obtain an estimate of pi
∏
j 6=i(1− pj) by calculating the frequency
of slots in which user i succeeds to transmit its packet, called qi. Finally, an estimate of pi can be
obtained by solving pi1−pi =
qi
qidle
for pi.
Requirement U. User i knows g∗ (and thus p˜) and p−i when it chooses its transmission probability.
Requirement U is sufficient for the Nash equilibrium of the contention game with TRD-based
intervention to be played by the users. User i can find its best response strategy by maximizing
u˜i given g
∗ and p−i. In fact, a weaker requirement is compatible with the Nash equilibrium of the
contention game with TRD-based intervention. Suppose that user i knows the form of intervention
function g∗ and the value of p˜i, and observes the intervention level p0. p˜ embedded in the TRD-
based intervention function g∗ can be thought of as a recommended strategy profile by the manager
(thus the communication from the manager to the users occurs indirectly through the function g∗).
Even though user i does not know the recommended strategies to other users, i.e., the values of
p˜j, j 6= i, it knows its recommended transmission probability. From the form of the intervention
function, user i can derive that it is of its best interest to follow the recommendation as long as all
the other users follow their recommended strategies. Observing p0 = 0 confirms its belief that other
users play the recommended strategies, and it has no reason to deviate.
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The users can acquire knowledge on the intervention function g∗ through one of three ways:
(i) known protocol, (ii) announcement, and (iii) learning. The first method is effective in the
case where a certain network manager operates in a certain channel (for example, a frequency
band). The community of users will know the protocol (or intervention function) used by the
manager. This method does not require any information exchange between the manager and the
users. Neither teaching of the manager nor learning of the users is necessary. However, there is
inflexibility in choosing an intervention function, and the manager cannot change his target strategy
profile frequently. Nevertheless, this is the method most often used in current wireless networks,
where users appertain to a predetermined class of known and homogeneous protocols.
The second method allows the manager to make the users know g∗ directly, which includes
information on the target p˜. The manager will execute his intervention according to the announced
intervention function because the Stackelberg equilibrium (g∗, p˜) achieves his objective. However, it
requires explicit message delivery from the manager to the users, which is sometimes costly or may
even be impossible in practice.
Finally, if the Stackelberg contention game is played repeatedly with the same intervention
function, the users may be able to recover the form of the intervention function chosen by the
manager based on their observations on (p0,p), for example, using learning techniques developed in
[17, 18, 19]. However, this process may take long and the users may not be able to collect enough
data to find out the true functional form if there is limited experimentation of the users.
Remark. If users are obedient, the manager can use centralized control by communicating p˜i to
user i. Additional communication and estimation overhead required for the Stackelberg equilibrium
can be considered as a cost incurred to deal with the selfish behavior of users, or to provide incentives
for users to follow p˜.
5.3 Limited Observability of the Manager
The construction of the TRD-based intervention function assumes that the manager can observe or
estimate the transmission probabilities of the users correctly. In real applications, the manager may
not be able to observe the exact choice made by each user. We consider several scenarios under
which the manager has limited observability and examine how the TRD-based intervention function
can be modified in those scenarios.
5.3.1 Quantized Observation
Let I = {I0, I1, . . . , Im} be a set of intervals which partition [0, 1]. We assume that each interval
contains its right end point. For simplicity, we will consider intervals of the same length. That
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Figure 3: Payoffs that can be achieved by the manager with quantized observation. (a) m = 5. (b)
m = 15.
is, I =
{
{0},
(
0, 1m
]
,
(
1
m ,
2
m
]
, . . . ,
(
m−1
m , 1
]}
, and we call I0 = {0} and Ir =
(
r−1
m ,
r
m
]
for all r =
1, . . . ,m.
Suppose that the manager only observes which interval in I each pi belongs to. In other words,
the manager observes ri instead of pi such that pi ∈ Iri . In this case, the level of intervention is
calculated based on r = (r1, . . . , rn) rather than p. It means that given p−i, p0 would be the same
for any pi, p
′
i if pi and p
′
i belong to the same Ir. Since any pi ∈
(
r−1
m ,
r
m
)
is weakly dominated by
pi =
r
m , the users will choose their transmission probabilities at the right end points of the intervals
in I. This in turn will affect the choice of a target by the manager. The manager will be restricted
to choose p˜ such that p˜i ∈
{
1
m , . . . ,
m−1
m
}
for all i ∈ N . Then the manager can implement p˜ with
the intervention function g(r) = g∗(p), where pi is set equal to
ri
m . In summary, the quantized
observation on p restricts the choice of p˜ by the manager from (0, 1)N to
{
1
m , . . . ,
m−1
m
}N
.
Figure 3 shows the payoff profiles that can be achieved by the manager with quantized observa-
tion. When the number of intervals is moderately large, the manager has many options near or on
the Pareto efficiency boundary.
5.3.2 Noisy Observation
We modify the Stackelberg contention game to analyze the case where the manager observes noisy
signals of the transmission probabilities of the users. Let Pi = [ǫ, 1− ǫ] be the strategy space of user
i, where ǫ is a small positive number. We assume that the users can observe the strategy profile
p, but the manager observes a noisy signal of p. The manager observes poi instead of pi where p
o
i
is uniformly distributed on [pi − ǫ, pi + ǫ], independently over i ∈ N . Suppose that the manager
chooses a target p˜ such that p˜i ∈ [2ǫ, 1− 2ǫ]. The expected payoff of user i when the manager uses
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Figure 4: Payoffs that can be achieved by the manager with noisy observation. (a) ǫ = 0.1. (b)
ǫ = 0.01.
an intervention function g is
E[u˜i(p; g)|p] = kipi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) (1− E[g(p
o)|p]) . (20)
Hence, the intervention function is effectively E[g(po)|p] instead of g(p) when the manager observes
po. If pˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the contention game with intervention g when p is perfectly
observable to the manager and E[g(po)|p] = g(p) for all p such that maxi∈N |pi − pˆi| ≤ ǫ, then
pˆ will still be a Nash equilibrium of the contention game with intervention g when the manager
observes a noisy signal of the strategy profile of the users.
Consider the TRD-based intervention function g∗. Since g∗(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ P and h(po) > 0
with a positive probability when p = p˜, E[g∗(po)|p˜] > 0 whereas g∗(p˜) = 0. Since g∗ is kinked at
p˜, the noise in po will distort the incentives of the users to choose p˜.
The manager can implement his target p˜ at the expense of intervention with a positive proba-
bility. If the manager adopts the following intervention function
g(p) =
∑
i∈N
1
1+ǫqpi − p˜i
p˜i
+
(n+ 1)ǫq
1 + ǫq
, (21)
where q =
∑
i∈N
1
p˜i
, then p˜ is a Nash equilibrium of the contention game with intervention g, but
the average level of intervention at p˜ is
E[g(po)|p˜] = g(p˜) =
ǫq
1 + ǫq
> 0, (22)
which can be thought of as the efficiency loss due to the noise in observations.
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Figure 4 illustrates the set of payoff profiles that can be achieved with the intervention function
given by (21). As the size of the noise gets smaller, the set expands to approach the Pareto efficiency
boundary.
5.3.3 Observation on the Aggregate Probability
We consider the case where the manager can observe only the frequency of the slots that are not
accessed by any user. If the users transmit their packets according to p, then the manager observes
only the aggregate probability
∏
i∈N (1 − pi). In this scenario, the intervention function that the
manager chooses has to be a function of
∏
i∈N (1 − pi), and this implies that the manager cannot
discriminate among the users.
The TRD-based intervention function g∗ allows the manager to use different reactions to each
user’s deviation. In the effective region where the TRD is between 0 and 1, one unit increase in
pi results in
1
p˜i
units increase in p0. However, this kind of discrimination through the structure of
the intervention function is impossible when the manager cannot observe individual transmission
probabilities.
This limitation forces the manager to treat the users equally, and the target has to be chosen
such that p˜i = p˜ for all i ∈ N . If the manager uses the following intervention function,
g(p) =
[
1
p˜(1− p˜)n−1
(
(1− p˜)n −
∏
i∈N
(1− pi)
)]1
0
(23)
then he can implement p˜ = (p˜, . . . , p˜) with g(p˜) = 0 as a Stackelberg equilibrium. Hence, if
the manager only observes the aggregate probability, this prevents him from setting the target
transmission probabilities differently across users.
Figure 5 shows the payoff profiles achieved with symmetric strategy profiles, which can be im-
plemented by the manager who observes the aggregate probability.
5.4 Limited Observability of the Users and Conjectural Equilibrium
We now relax Requirement U and assume that user i can observe only the aggregate probability
(1−p0)
∏
j 6=i(1−pj). Even though the users do not know the exact form of the intervention function
of the manager, they are aware of the dependence of p0 on their transmission probabilities and try
to model this dependence based on their observations (pi, (1 − p0)
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj)). Specifically, user
i builds a conjecture function fi : [0, 1] → [0, 1], which means that user i conjectures that the value
of (1− p0)
∏
j 6=i(1− pj) will be fi(pi) if he chooses pi. The equilibrium concept appropriate in this
context is conjectural equilibrium first introduced by Hahn [20].
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Figure 5: Payoffs that can be achieved by the manager who observes only the aggregate probability.
(a) Homogeneous users with k1 = k2 = 1. (b) Heterogeneous users with k1 = 1 and k2 = 2.
Definition 4 A strategy profile pˆ and a profile of conjectures (f1, . . . , fn) constitutes a conjectural
equilibrium of the contention game with intervention g if
kipˆi fi(pˆi) ≥ kipi fi(pi) for all pi ∈ Pi (24)
and
fi(pˆi) = (1− g(pˆ))
∏
j 6=i
(1− pˆj) (25)
for all i ∈ N .
The first condition states that pˆi is optimal given user i’s conjecture fi, and the second condition
says that its conjecture is consistent with its observation. It can be seen from this definition that
the conjectural equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium in that any Nash equilibrium
is a conjectural equilibrium with every user holding the correct conjecture given others’ strategies.
On the other hand, it is quite general in some cases, and in the game we consider, for any strategy
profile pˆ ∈ P , there exists a conjecture profile (f1, . . . , fn) that constitutes a conjectural equilibrium.
For example, we can set fi(pi) = (1− g(pˆ))
∏
j 6=i(1− pˆj) if pi = pˆi and 0 otherwise.
Since the TRD-based intervention function g∗ is linear in each pi, it is natural for the users to
adopt a conjecture function of the linear form. Let us assume that conjecture functions are of the
following trimmed linear form:
fi(pi) = [ai − bipi]
1
0 (26)
for some ai, bi > 0.
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We say that a conjecture function fi is linearly consistent at pˆ if it is locally correct up to
the first derivative at pˆ, i.e., fi(pˆi) = (1 − g(pˆ))
∏
j 6=i(1 − pˆj) and f
′
i(pˆi) = −
∂g(pˆ)
∂pi
∏
j 6=i(1 − pˆj).
Since the TRD-based intervention function g∗ is linear in each pi, the conjecture function f
∗
i (pi) ,
g∗(pi, p˜−i) is linearly consistent at p˜, and p˜ and (f
∗
1 , . . . , f
∗
n) constitutes a conjectural equilibrium.
Therefore, as long as the users use linearly consistent conjectures, limited observability of the users
does not affect the final outcome. To build linearly consistent conjectures, however, the users need
to experiment and collect data using local deviations from the equilibrium point in a repeated play
of the Stackelberg contention game. A loss in performance may result during this learning phase.
6 Illustrative Results
6.1 Homogeneous Users
We assume that the users are homogeneous with ki = 1 for all i ∈ N . Given a transmission
probability profile p, the system utilization ratio can be defined as the probability of successful
transmission in a given slot
τ(p) =
∑
i∈N
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj). (27)
Note that the maximum system utilization ratio is 1, which occurs when only one user transmits
with probability 1 while others never transmit. Table 1 shows the individual payoffs and the system
utilization ratios for the number of users 3, 10, and 100 when the manager implements the target
at the symmetric efficient strategy profile p˜ = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n).
n Individual Payoff System Utilization Ratio
3 0.14815 0.44444
10 0.03874 0.38742
100 0.00370 0.36973
Table 1. Individual payoffs and system utilization ratios with homogeneous users
We can see that packets are transmitted in approximately 37% of the slots with a large number of
users even if there is no explicit coordination among the users. The system utilization of our model
converges to 1/e ≈ 36.8% as n goes to infinity, which coincides with the maximal throughput of a
slotted Aloha system with Poisson arrivals and an infinite number of users [21]. But in our model
users maintain their selfish behavior, and we do not use any feedback information on the channel
state.
22
6.2 Heterogeneous Users
We now consider users with difference valuations. Specifically, we assume that ki = i for i =
1, . . . , n. We will consider three targets: p˜1 = (1, . . . , n)/
∑n
i=1 i, p˜
2 = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n), and p˜
3 with
which u˜i(p˜
3; g∗) = u˜j(p˜
3; g∗) for all i, j. p˜1 assigns a higher transmission probability to a user with
a higher valuation. p˜2 treats all the users equally regardless of their valuations. p˜3 is egalitarian in
that it yields the same individual payoff to every user, which implies that a user with a low valuation
is assigned a higher transmission probability.
Average Aggregate Standard System Nash Generalized
Target n Individual Payoff Deviation of Utilization Product Nash
Payoff Payoffs Ratio Product
3 0.38889 1.16667 0.32710 0.47222 1.28601e-2 2.48073e-3
p˜1 10 0.28048 2.80481 0.24643 0.39384 3.40193e-9 4.57497e-30
100 0.24855 24.85466 0.22189 0.37034 2.12632e-98 ≈ 0
3 0.29630 0.88889 0.12096 0.44444 1.95092e-2 1.14183e-3
p˜2 10 0.21308 2.13081 0.11127 0.38742 2.76432e-8 4.83117e-34
100 0.18671 18.67135 0.10673 0.36973 5.73364e-86 ≈ 0
3 0.25133 0.75400 0 0.46078 1.58765e-2 2.52064e-4
p˜3 10 0.13753 1.37533 0 0.40283 2.42148e-9 4.09682e-48
100 0.07303 7.30337 0 0.37885 2.25070e-114 ≈ 0
Table 2. Average individual payoffs, aggregate payoffs, standard deviations of individual payoffs,
system utilization ratios, Nash products, and generalized Nash products with heterogeneous users
Table 2 shows that a tradeoff between efficiency (measured by the sum of payoffs) and equity
exists when users are heterogeneous. A higher aggregate payoff is achieved when users with high
valuations are given priority. At the same time, it limits access by users with low valuations, which
increases variations in individual payoffs. Also, the results in Table 2 are consistent with that p˜2 is
a Nash bargaining solution and that p˜1 is a nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights
equal to valuations.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the problem of multiple users who share a common communication channel. Us-
ing the game theory framework, we have shown that selfish behavior is likely to lead to a network
collapse. However, full system utilization requires coordination among users using explicit message
exchanges, which may be impractical given the distributed nature of wireless networks. To achieve
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a better performance without coordination schemes, users need to sustain cooperation. We provide
incentives for selfish users to limit their access to the channel by introducing an intervention function
of the network manager. With TRD-based intervention functions, the manager can implement any
outcome of the contention game as a Stackelberg equilibrium. We have discussed the amount of in-
formation required for implementation, and how the various kinds of relaxations of the requirements
affect the outcome of the Stackelberg contention game.
Our approach of using an intervention function to improve network performance can be applied
to other situations in wireless communications. Potential applications of the idea include sustaining
cooperation in multi-hop networks and limiting the attack of adversary users. An intervention
function may be designed to serve as a coordination device in addition to providing selfish users
with incentives to cooperate. Finally, designing a protocol that enables users to play the role of
the manager in a distributed manner will be critical to ensure that our approach can be adopted in
completely decentralized communication scenarios, where no manager is present.
A Proof of Proposition 3
Recall h(p) = p1p˜1 + · · ·+
pn
p˜n
−n used to define g∗(p). We examine whether a strategy profile pˆ with
pˆi < 1 for all i ∈ N constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γg∗ by considering four cases on the value of
h(pˆ).
Case 1. h(pˆ) < 0.
Let ǫ = −h(pˆ) > 0. If user i changes its transmission probability from pˆi to pˆi + ǫ, then its
payoff increases because p0 is still zero. Hence pˆ cannot be a Nash equilibrium if h(pˆ) < 0.
Case 2. h(pˆ) = 0.
Consider arbitrary user i. If it deviates to pi < pˆi, p0 is still zero and u˜i decreases. u˜i(pi, pˆ−i) is
differentiable and strictly concave on pi > pˆi. Since
du˜i
dpi
= (ki
∏
j 6=i(1− pˆj))(1 + n−
∑
j 6=i
pˆj
p˜j
− 2pip˜i ),
ki > 0 and pˆi < 1 for all i,
sign

du˜i
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=pˆi

 = sign

1 + n−∑
j 6=i
pˆj
p˜j
− 2
pˆi
p˜i

 (28)
= sign

1 + n− n∑
j=1
pˆj
p˜j
−
pˆi
p˜i

 (29)
= sign
(
1−
pˆi
p˜i
)
. (30)
There is no gain for user i from deviating to any pi > pˆi if and only if
du˜i
dpi
|pi=pˆi ≤ 0, which is
equivalent to pˆi ≥ p˜i. For pˆ to be a Nash equilibrium, we need pˆi ≥ p˜i for all i = 1, . . . , n. To satisfy
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h(pˆ) = 0, all inequalities should be equalities. Hence, only pˆ = p˜ is a Nash equilibrium among pˆ
such that h(pˆ) = 0.
Case 3. 0 < h(pˆ) < 1.
Since u˜i ≥ 0, there is no gain for user i to deviate to pi such that h(pi, pˆ−i) ≥ 1. If there is a
gain from deviation to pi such that h(pi, pˆ−i) < 0, then there is another profitable deviation p
′
i such
that h(p′i, pˆ−i) = 0 by using the argument of Case 1. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to
deviations pi that lead to 0 ≤ h(pi, pˆ−i) < 1. At such a deviation by user i,
u˜i(pi, pˆ−i) = ki
∏
j 6=i
(1− pˆj)pi

1 + n−∑
j 6=i
pˆj
p˜j
−
pi
p˜i

 . (31)
pˆi is best response to pˆ−i if and only if
du˜i
dpi
|pi=pˆi = 0. Using the first derivative given in Case 2, we
obtain
pˆi
p˜i
= 1 + n−
n∑
j=1
pˆj
p˜j
= 1− h(pˆ) < 1. (32)
For pˆ to be a Nash equilibrium, the above inequality should be satisfied for every i, which in turn
implies
n∑
i=1
pˆi
p˜i
< n, (33)
and this contradicts to the initial assumption h(pˆ) > 0. Therefore, there is no pˆ with 0 < h(pˆ) < 1
that constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Case 4. h(pˆ) ≥ 1.
Since u˜i(pˆ) = 0 for every i, there is a profitable deviation of user i only if there exists pi ∈ (0, pˆi)
such that h(pi, pˆ−i) < 1. Equivalently, if setting pi = 0 yields h(pi, pˆ−i) ≥ 1, then there is no
profitable deviation of user i from pˆi. Since
h(0, pˆ−i) =
∑
j 6=i
pˆj
p˜j
− n, (34)
pˆ with h(pˆ) ≥ 1 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
∑
j 6=i
pˆj
p˜j
− n ≥ 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. (35)
B Proof of Proposition 4
Consider t = 1. User i chooses pˆ1i to maximize
u˜1i (pi, pˆ
0
−i) = kipi
(
1− g1(pi, pˆ
0
−i)
)∏
j 6=i
(1− pˆ0j) (36)
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=

ki
∏
j 6=i(1− pˆ
0
j )pi if pi < p˜i
(
1− pˆ
0
n
p˜n
+
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
,
ki
∏
j 6=i(1− pˆ
0
j )pi
(
2− pˆ
0
n
p˜n
+
pˆ0i
p˜i
− pip˜i
)
if p˜i
(
1− pˆ
0
n
p˜n
+
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
≤ pi ≤ p˜i
(
2− pˆ
0
n
p˜n
+
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
,
0 if pi > p˜i
(
2− pˆ
0
n
p˜n
+
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
.
(37)
If 0 ≤ pˆ
0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
< 2, the maximum is attained at pˆ1i that satisfies
pˆ1i
p˜i
= 1−
1
2
(
pˆ0n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
. (38)
Notice that pˆ1n = p˜n.
If pˆ
0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
≥ 2, then u˜1i (pi, pˆ
0
−i) = 0 for all pi ≥ 0. Since any pi is a best response in this case,
we assume that pˆ1i = pˆ
0
i .
4
Consider t = 2. First, consider user i such that pˆ
0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
< 2. Since pˆ
1
n
p˜n
−
pˆ1i
p˜i
= 12
(
pˆ0n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
,
0 ≤ pˆ
1
n
p˜n
−
pˆ1i
p˜i
< 2. Using an analogous argument, we get
pˆ2i
p˜i
= 1−
1
2
(
pˆ1n
p˜n
−
pˆ1i
p˜i
)
= 1−
1
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(
pˆ0n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
. (39)
Next consider user i such that
pˆ0i
p˜i
≤ 1. Since pˆ
1
n
p˜n
= 1, we again have 0 ≤ pˆ
1
n
p˜n
−
pˆ1i
p˜i
< 2 and the
best response is given by
pˆ2i
p˜i
= 1−
1
2
(
pˆ1n
p˜n
−
pˆ1i
p˜i
)
= 1−
1
2
(
pˆ1n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
. (40)
Considering a general t ≥ 2, we get
pˆti
p˜i
= 1−
1
2t
(
pˆ0n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
(41)
for user i such that pˆ
0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
< 2 and
pˆti
p˜i
= 1−
1
2t−1
(
pˆ1n
p˜n
−
pˆ0i
p˜i
)
(42)
for user i such that
pˆ0i
p˜i
≤ 1. Taking limits as t→∞, we obtain the conclusions of the proposition.
C Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that the users in the coalition S = {i, j} choose (pi, pj) instead of (p˜i, p˜j). Then
h(pi, pj , p˜−S) =
pi
p˜i
+
pj
p˜j
+ (n − 2)− n =
pi
p˜i
+
pj
p˜j
− 2, (43)
4If we assume that pˆ1i is chosen according to (38), we do not need the assumption that for each i either
pˆ0
n
p˜n
−
pˆ0
i
p˜i
< 2
or
pˆ0
i
p˜i
≤ 1 in the proposition.
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and
u˜i(pi, pj , p˜−S) = ki
∏
k/∈S
(1− p˜k)pi(1− pj)(1− g
∗(pi, pj, p˜−S)), (44)
u˜j(pi, pj, p˜−S) = kj
∏
k/∈S
(1− p˜k)pj(1− pi)(1− g
∗(pi, pj, p˜−S)). (45)
Hence, p˜ is coalition-proof with respect to S if and only if there does not exist (pi, pj) ∈ [0, 1]
2 such
that
pi(1− pj)(1 − g
∗(pi, pj , p˜−S)) ≥ p˜i(1− p˜j), (46)
pj(1− pi)(1 − g
∗(pi, pj , p˜−S)) ≥ p˜j(1− p˜i) (47)
with at least one inequality strict.
First, notice that setting pi = p˜i and pj 6= p˜j will violate one of the two inequalities. The
inequality for user i will not hold if pj > p˜j , and the one for user j will not hold if pj < p˜j. Hence,
both pi 6= p˜i and pj 6= p˜j are necessary to have both inequalities satisfied at the same time. We
consider four possible cases.
Case 1. pi < p˜i and pj > p˜j
Since g∗(·) ≥ 0, (46) is violated.
Case 2. pi > p˜i and pj < p˜j
Equation (47) is violated.
Case 3. pi < p˜i and pj < p˜j
Since h(pi, pj , p˜−S) < 0, g
∗(pi, pj, p˜−S) = 0. Hence, (46) and (47) become
pi(1− pj) ≥ p˜i(1− p˜j), (48)
pj(1− pi) ≥ p˜j(1− p˜i). (49)
We consider the contour curves of pi(1−pj) and pj(1−pi) going through (p˜i, p˜j) in the (pi, pj)-plane.
The slope of the contour curve of pi(1− pj) at (p˜i, p˜j) is
1−p˜j
p˜i
and that of pj(1− pi) is
p˜j
1−p˜i
. There
is no area of mutual improvement if and only if
1− p˜j
p˜i
≥
p˜j
1− p˜i
, (50)
which is equivalent to p˜i + p˜j ≤ 1.
Case 4. pi > p˜i and pj > p˜j
Since h(pi, pj , p˜−S) > 0, g
∗(pi, pj , p˜−S) = h(pi, pj , p˜−S) as long as
pi
p˜i
+
pj
p˜j
≤ 3. Hence, (46) and
(47) become
pi(1− pj)
(
3−
pi
p˜i
−
pj
p˜j
)
≥ p˜i(1− p˜j), (51)
pj(1− pi)
(
3−
pi
p˜i
−
pj
p˜j
)
≥ p˜j(1− p˜i). (52)
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The slope of the contour curve of pi(1− pj)
(
3− pip˜i −
pj
p˜j
)
at (p˜i, p˜j) is
(1− p˜j)
(
3− 2 p˜ip˜i −
p˜j
p˜j
)
p˜i
(
3 + 1p˜j −
p˜i
p˜i
− 2
p˜j
p˜j
) = 0, (53)
and that of pj(1− pi)
(
3− pip˜i −
pj
p˜j
)
is
p˜j
(
3 + 1p˜i − 2
p˜i
p˜i
−
p˜j
p˜j
)
(1− p˜i)
(
3− p˜ip˜i − 2
p˜j
p˜j
) = +∞. (54)
Therefore, there is no (pi, pj) > (p˜i, p˜j) that satisfies (46) and (47) at the same time.
D Proof of Proposition 7
The “if” part is trivial because a strategy profile that is coalition-proof with respect to the grand
coalition is Pareto efficient. To establish the “only if” part, we will prove that if for a given strategy
profile there exists a coalition that can improve the payoffs of its members then its deviation will
not hurt other users outside of the coalition, which shows that the original strategy profile is not
Pareto efficient.
Consider a strategy profile p˜ and a coalition S ⊂ N that can improve upon p˜ by deviating from
p˜S to pS . Let p0 = g
∗(pS , p˜−S) the transmission probability of the manager after the deviation by
coalition S. Since choosing pS instead of p˜S yields higher payoffs to the members of S, we have
pi(1− p0)
∏
j∈S\{i}
(1− pj) ≥ p˜i
∏
j∈S\{i}
(1− p˜j) (55)
for all i ∈ S with at least one inequality strict. We want to show that the members not in the
coalition S do not get lower payoffs as a result of the deviation by S, that is,
(1− p0)
∏
j∈S
(1− pj) ≥
∏
j∈S
(1− p˜j). (56)
Suppose (1 − p0)
∏
j∈S(1 − pj) <
∏
j∈S(1 − p˜j). We can see that p0 < 1 and 0 < pi < 1 for all
i ∈ S because the right-hand side of (55) is strictly positive. Combining this inequality with (55)
yields pi > p˜i for all i ∈ S, which implies p0 > 0.
We can write pi = p˜i+ ǫi for some ǫi > 0 for i ∈ S. Then p0 = g
∗(pS , p˜−S) =
∑
i∈S
ǫi
p˜i
. (55) can
be rewritten as
p˜i
∏
j∈S\{i}
(1− p˜j) ≤ (p˜i + ǫi)(1− p0)
∏
j∈S\{i}
(1− p˜j − ǫj) (57)
< (p˜i + ǫi)(1− p0)
∏
j∈S\{i}
(1− p˜j) (58)
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for all i ∈ S. Simplifying this gives
ǫi
p˜i
>
p0
1− p0
(59)
for all i ∈ S. Summing these inequalities up over i ∈ S, we get
p0 =
∑
i∈S
ǫi
p˜i
> |S|
p0
1− p0
(60)
where |S| is the number of the members in S. This inequality simplifies to p0 < 1− |S| ≤ 0, which
is a contradiction.
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